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Abstract
This essay presents a new theory explaining increased wage inequality. A stan-
dard endogenous growth model is augmented with occupational choice of high-
skill workers. Depending on the occupational choice, high-skill workers earn either
a certain or uncertain income. Wage inequality, measured by the average wage of
high-skill workers divided by the average wage of low-skill workers, can increase
or decrease due to an increased supply of high-skill workers.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing consensus that over the last 25 years, the dispersion of income and
wages have increased in developed countries. The U.S. and the U.K experienced a
larger dispersion earlier then most other countries but later several other countries fell in
line. Those changes are well documented by among others Förster and Pearson (2002).
The dispersion of wages can be decomposed into dispersion among individuals with
similar characteristics (residual wage inequality) and dispersion between individuals
with different characteristics, such as for example skill, experience or gender.
In order to briefly exemplify the changes, consider the changes in the U.S. during the
period 1973 to 1989. The wage rate for the 10 percent at the top of the wage distribution
increased by approximately 20%, greatly surpassing the growth rate of wages at the
median, which was approximately 5%. Even more strikingly, the wage rate for the
poorest 10% decreased by about 25% during the same period (Juhn et al. 1993). Those
divergent trends for the wage rates of the lowest paid and the highest paid workers are
likely to have a profound impact on income. This is confirmed by Gottschalk, reporting
that the real income ratio between the 80th and 20th percentiles in the distribution shows
a clear upward trend in the period 1968 to 1992 (Gottschalk 1997, p. 23).
This paper focuses on two components of inequality. On the one hand, the distri-
bution of wages between individuals with different skill levels. On the other hand, the
distribution of wages among high-skill workers.
The dispersion of wages between high-skill workers and low-skill workers in the
U.S. has increased. Gottschalk’s annual (log) wage regressions, including a dummy
variable for college graduates shows a decreasing trend during the first part of the period,
1970 – 1980, and there after an increasing trend during the 1980s (Gottschalk 1997).
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However, as the difference in wages between college graduates and high school gradu-
ates increased, wage dispersion among both groups’ members also widened. There is a
very small fraction at the bottom of the wage distribution of college graduates that ex-
perienced decreased real wages whereas college graduates at the top of the distribution
gained more then 20 percent in real terms (Juhn et al. 1993, p. 422, fig. 6).
1.1 Contribution
The central idea in this paper is that workers can make an active choice concerning risk
exposure. Exposing oneself to more risk in the model is considered a substitute for
decreased wage earnings. Endogenous choices of occupation, i.e. whether or not to
expose oneself to risk, changes the economy’s distribution of wages. Workers charac-
terized by relative risk aversion would never substitute lower earnings for increased risk
unless paid a risk premium. Hence there must exist a sector in the economy to which
workers can switch and which is characterized by higher but more uncertain returns.
The research sector is assumed to be such a sector in this paper.
By this approach, this paper draws heavily on the literature on entrepreneurship,
which can be traced back to the writings of Knight (1921). Knight’s ideas have been
formalized, at least partially, by Kanbur (1979) and Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979). A
fundamental property of those models is that entrepreneurs bear risk. Workers chose to
become entrepreneurs only if the expected utility of being an entrepreneur exceeds the
certain utility of ordinary work with a certain wage rate. The difference in this paper
is that entrepreneurs are high-skill workers that form co-operatives, and hence do not
employ workers.
A second strand of literature which this paper relies on is the endogenous growth
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models where growth is driven by development of new intermediate goods. This idea
is formalized by Romer (1990). The model presented in this paper augments Romer’s
model by introducing stochastic development of new intermediate goods.
The model postulates to two main characteristics of research activity. First, it is as-
sumed that only high-skill workers can work in the research sector. This is a crude en-
forcement of the assumption that research is human capital intensive (Barro and Xavier
1995, p. 179) and hence high-skill workers have an advantage over low-skill work-
ers. Second, research is stochastic. Researchers directly face uncertainty concerning
the products ex post productivity or ex post capacity to generate utility and therefore
its value. It is common to model firms as risk neutral. Risk neutral firms maximize
expected profits and, hence, Pareto optimality implies that risk averse agents negotiate
wage contracts with no uncertainty. This paper models research firms as co-operatives.
The members share the revenues and the firm’s decisions are determined by the repre-
sentative member, trying to maximize his or her utility.
The choice to model research firms as co-operatives is not to be taken literally. Co-
operatives are used in order to keep the analysis simple and emphasis research firms’
need to share risk with their employees. Risk sharing between firms and employees can
take on several shapes ranging from for example flexible working hour arrangements to
profit bonuses and options programs where employees are offered stock shares.
The model abstracts from all kinds of risk sharing by financial markets. Not allow-
ing any insurance possibilities via financial markets unrealistic but this assumption is
made to simplify the model. The key assumption is that firms and workers can benefit
from risk sharing. It is however to important to recognize that precluding risk-sharing
can have strong implications. As is shown by Newman (1999), combining the standard
theory of entrepreneurship (Kanbur 1979; Kihlstrom and Laffont 1979) with moral haz-
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ard considerations and some risk sharing can reverse some of the standard results. Since
the analysis is very similar to the standard entrepreneur theory some caution should be
applied.
Within the framework in this paper, increasing the supply of high-skill workers shifts
high-skill workers into research co-operatives, paying a stochastic wage rate. On the one
hand, more high-skill workers earn a stochastic wage rate, increasing the residual wage
inequality among high-skill workers. On the other hand more high-skill workers earn
a risk premium, tending to increase the average wage rate for high-skill workers. To
summarize, the two main hypotheses investigated in this paper are:
1. An increased supply of high-skill workers increases the wage dispersion among
high-skill workers.
2. An increased supply of high-skill workers increases the wage dispersion between
high-skill and low-skill workers.
The first hypothesis refers to the residual wage inequality for high-skill workers, while
the second hypothesis concerns the skill premium.
1.2 Related Literature
The analysis in this paper does not fit into any of the three broad categories generally
used to explain changes in the distribution, namely skill-biased technological change
(Acemoglu 1998; Krusell et al. 2000), increased trade (Aghion et al. 1999; Borjas and
Ramey 1995; Wood 1995, 1998), or institutional change (DiNardo and Lemieux 1997;
Fortin and Lemieux 1997).
The idea that an increased supply of high-skill workers can increase the skill pre-
mium is not new. In Acemoglu (1998), and also Kiley (1999), an increased supply of
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high-skill workers can increase the skill premium due to an increased market size for
inventions, directed towards high-skill workers, possibly increasing the skill premium
in the long run. Acemoglu’s paper is remotely connected to this paper in the sense that
the skill premium increases due to changes in the research process.
In Machin and Manning (1997) and Acemoglu (1999), increasing the supply of high-
skill workers motivates firms to open vacancies taylored to high-skill workers, thereby
increasing the productivity of high-skill workers relative to low-skill workers. This in
turn increases the relative wage for high-skill workers.
In the paper by Rosén and Wasmer (2005), the skill premium is positively correlated
with the relative supply of high-skill workers due to the increased outside option of
firms in their wage negotiations. In Rosén and Wasmer’s paper wages are determined
in Nash-bargains and increases in firms’ outside option hurts low paid (i.e. low-skill)
workers more then high-skill workers, increasing the skill premium.
It is reasonable to assume that there is an asymmetry between high-skill and low-
skill workers. While high-skill workers can occupy low-skill jobs, low-skill workers
cannot occupy high-skill jobs. Auerbach and Skott (2005) investigate the impact of a
skill neutral productivity slow down given this asymmetry. As productivity decreases,
more high-skill workers occupy low-skill jobs and residual wage inequality of high-skill
workers increases.
A somewhat similar argument is presented in Mendez (2002). For incentive reasons,
workers producing goods in the early stage of the product cycle are paid efficiency
wages, while workers in the later stage are paid competitive wages. This creates a wage
gap between workers in the early and late stage of the product cycle, and workers that
fail to find work producing products in the early stage earn a lower wage rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the formal model. Section
6
3 summarizes the results obtained. Section 4 concludes and summarizes the findings.
Appendix A contains a full record of notation. The subsequent appendix contain proofs
and derivations.
2 Model
The model used to study the occupational choices of high-skill workers originates from
Romer (1990)’s endogenous growth model. Romer’s model is characterized by hori-
zontal innovations, that is new innovations do not replace innovations made earlier but
complement them. A vertical innovation process is modeled in, for example, Aghion
and Howitt (1992). In their model inventions lead to monopoly power, but by cre-
ative destruction, any new invention erodes the previous monopolist’s profit, whereas
in Romer’s model, monopoly profits last forever. This paper simplifies Romer’s model
by assuming that monopoly profits are eroded exogenously after one period and leaving
out the distinction between designs and intermediate goods.
Leaving out the distinction between intermediate goods and designs simplifies the
presentation of the model by reducing the number of concepts but can also be confusing.
It is important to realize that already produced intermediate goods can not be stored and
used in the subsequent period. Therefore, at the beginning of each period the number
of intermediate goods ready to be used in production is zero. However there exists a
variety of old intermediate goods that can be produced, i.e. in Romer’s words, there
exists a variety of designs for intermediate goods.
Workers live for one period and consume their entire wage. They derive utility from
consuming w units of the single consumption good. Preferences over consumption are
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described by expected utility under the CRRA utility function:
u(w) =
w1−θ
1−θ θ > 0.
At the expense of realism but for the benefit of simplicity all forms of non fully depre-
ciating capital are excluded from the model. However, the model includes capital that
is fully used up in the production process and therefore called intermediate goods.
The economy’s total endowment of labor is normalized to unity. Workers can be
divided into two categories depending on the worker’s level of human capital, high-skill
workers and low-skill workers. The fraction of high-skill workers is denoted φ, and
hence 1−φ denotes the fraction of low-skill workers. The fraction of the labor force
being considered high-skill is taken to be exogenous. While in reality, φ is endogenous
in this analysis φ is exogenous. This is a reasonable assumption as long as the changes
in the skill composition of the work force is slow relative to other responses. This seems
reasonable in the present context, since switching occupation can be done several times
during a lifetime while human investment in general are made once at young age.
It will be assumed that high-skill workers can replace low-skill workers, but not the
opposite. This implies that high-skill workers never earn less than low-skill workers in
equilibrium. If wages for low-skill workers were higher than wages for high-skill work-
ers, some high-skill workers would switch to the low-skill occupation until both groups’
wages were equalized. It will be assumed that there are enough low-skill workers, to
ensure that wages of high-skill workers are higher than wages of low-skill workers.
The sectors in the economy can be divided into two categories depending on what
they produce. One of the sectors produce the single consumption good by employing
high-skill workers and purchasing a variety of fully depreciating intermediate goods.
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The other sector produces the set of intermediate goods. While low-skill workers only
have the possibility to work in the intermediate goods sector, high-skill workers have the
possibility to work in either sector, either as a worker in the consumption good sector
or as a member of a co-operative in the intermediate goods sector. Co-operatives invent
and produce new intermediate goods. A larger variety of intermediate goods increases
the economy’s total output, i.e. generates growth. Research co-operatives invent new
intermediate goods and sell these to consumption good producers. Therefore the number
of intermediate goods is endogenous. The gains from inventing a new intermediate good
arise due to the one period monopoly profit derived from selling it to the producers of
final goods. The share of high-skill workers doing research is denoted µ.
Intermediate goods are categorized as old or new. A new intermediate good is
considered as an old intermediate good the subsequent period. Hence a research co-
operative have monopoly for one period. The number of old intermediate goods, de-
noted by ko, is predetermined while the number of new intermediate goods, denoted by
kn, is endogenous. Old intermediate goods are available at the beginning of the period
and produced by low-skill labor while new intermediate goods are invented and pro-
duced by high-skill workers in the research sector. Xo,i denotes the quantity of the ith
old intermediate good and Xn,i denotes the quantity of the ith new intermediate good.
Since high-skill workers can choose to work in the stochastic research sector and
invent and produce new intermediate goods, at the time of production the set of inter-
mediate goods is extended by those newly invented intermediate goods, i.e. kn newly
invented intermediated goods can be used by consumption good producers. Hence, at
the time of production, consumption good producers can combine ko + kn different in-
termediate goods to produce the consumption good.
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Figure 1: Choice Sequence
Final Good Producers
Choice of Sc t0
High-Skill Workers
Choice of occupation
t1 > t0
Co-operatives Develop
Realization of the εis
Final Good Propducers
Choice of Xo,i and Xn,i t2 > t1
Producers of Old Intermediates
Choice of Lo,i
The figure shows the sequence of choices, within a single period.
2.1 The Consumption Good Sector
The model’s single consumption good is produced by combining high-skill labor, and
intermediate goods. Hence each firm producing the consumption good must decide
upon hiring a certain quantity of high-skill labor, denoted Sc, and purchase a certain
quantity of each available intermediate good, i.e. chose values for all members of the
set X = {Xo,i | i = 1,2, ...,ko}∪{Xn,i | i = 1,2, ...,kn}. The production function obeys
to the standard properties, such as diminishing marginal productivity in each input and
constant returns to scale. These properties eliminate profits in the consumption good
sector. The old intermediate good i’s productivity is measured by γi and the new inter-
mediate good i’s productivity is measured by εi. Formally the technology is described
by:
Y = Sαc
[
ko∑
i=1
γiX1−αo,i +
kn∑
i=1
εiX1−αn,i
]
α ∈ (0,1). (1)
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The constant returns to scale property and perfect competition implies that firms in the
consumption good sector can be modeled as a single price taking firm. In what follows,
let Po,i denote the price of the ith old intermediate good, let Pn,i denote the price of
the ith new intermediate good, and let wc denote the wage rate for high-skill workers
employed in the consumption good sector. Competitive behavior implies that prices of
intermediate goods and the wage rate are taken as given by producers of the final good.
In every period, a sequence of choices are made by different agents. The order in
which choices are made is illustrated in Figure 1. At the start of every period, high-
skill workers choose either to work for firms producing the final good or to start a
co-operative and final good producers choose the amount of high-skill workers, Sc, to
employ.
Next, every co-operative develops a new intermediate good and its productivity is
revealed, i.e. the value of εi is revealed. Finally, final good producers choose the quan-
tity of every intermediate input to use, and producers of old intermediate goods hire
low-skill labor.
The objective function for the competitive final good producer is
pi = Sαc
[
ko∑
i=1
γiX1−αo,i +
kn∑
i=1
εiX1−αn,i
]
− wcSc−
ko∑
i=1
Po,iXo,i−
kn∑
i=1
Pn,iXn,i, (2)
where the price of the consumption good is normalized to unity. Profit maximizing
behavior yields the following inverse factor demand functions:
Po,i = (1−α)γi S
α
c
Xαo,i
(3a)
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Pn,i = (1−α)εi S
α
c
Xαn,i
(3b)
wc =
αY
Sc
= αSα−1c
[
ko∑
i=1
γiX1−αo,i +
kn∑
i=1
EεiX1−αn,i
]
. (3c)
To obtain those first order conditions, first maximize the objective function in (2), given
the realizations of every γi and εi, with respect to every Xo,i and every Xn,i, taking Sc as
given. Those first order conditions are the profit maximizing choices corresponding to
node t2 in Figure 1, for any choice of Sc and any realization of the productivity variables,
i.e. the different ε’s.
At the t0 node in Figure 1, the price taking producer of the final good maximizes
the expected value of the objective function in (2), where every occurrence of Xo,i and
Xn,i have been replaced, using the first order conditions in (3a) and (3b). This first order
condition implies a zero profit condition, but by, again, using the first order conditions in
(3a) and (3b) to eliminate every Po,i and Pn,i, the first order condition in (3c) is obtained.
Those first order conditions define the cost minimizing mix of high-skill labor and in-
termediate goods. Since the tecnology is characterized by constant returns to scale and
the firm act as a price taker, the scale of production is not determined by the first order
conditions but from a set of equilibrium market clearing conditions.
The choice of technology ensures that high-skill workers in the consumption good
sector share a constant fraction, α, of total output. The inverse demand functions are
intuitive, a more productive intermediate good, γ or ε large, increases the expenditure
on the intermediate good.
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2.2 The Intermediate Goods Sector
The knowledge necessary to produce old intermediate goods is freely available to all
workers and hence it is most appropriate to model the market for old intermediate goods
as a perfectly competitive market with zero profits. The knowledge necessary to pro-
duce new intermediate goods is only available for the workers that developed the new
intermediate. Hence, a co-operative that develops a new intermediate good becomes
the sole producer of that good. Therefore the market for a new intermediate good is
characterized by monopoly.
2.2.1 Old Intermediate Goods
Old intermediate goods are produced by low-skill labor. To keep the analysis simple it
is assumed that one unit of low-skill labor produces one unit of the intermediate good.
Formally:
Xo,i = Lo,i. (4)
The linear technology and the competitive market implies that the size of the firm is
indeterminate but the industry can be modeled as if there is a single competitive firm.
Hence the production of a specific old intermediate good Xo,i is modeled as such. The
profit maximization problem for a competitive firm producing an old intermediate i is:
max
Lo,i
Po,iLo,i−woLo,i. (5)
The price taking firm takes Po,i and wo as given but chooses the quantity of low-skill
labor, Lo,i, to employ. The first order condition for this problem ensures zero profit,
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but does not, as noted above, pin down the number of employees in the firm. The first
order/zero profit condition is:
wo = Po,i. (6)
In order to find the number of employees engaged in producing an old intermediate
good i, combine the zero profit equation (6) with the inverse demand function for old
intermediates, given by (3a). Total output and total employment in a industry producing
the old intermediate good Xo,i become:
Xo,i = Lo,i = Sc
[
(1−α)γi
wo
] 1
α
. (7)
Wages for low-skill workers must be equal across all firms producing intermediate
goods since there is no stickiness in the economy. Therefore, it is not necessary to
index the wage rate for low-skill workers by the specific old intermediate good they
produce. As seen by (6), all old intermediate goods are sold at the same price, but
more productive intermediate goods are sold in larger quantities, see (7). Hence it is not
necessary to index the price of old intermediates. Henceforth Po will denote the price of
any old intermediate good.
2.2.2 New Intermediate Goods
A co-operative producing a new intermediate good must spend a fixed amount, l, of la-
bor units in order to develop the new intermediate good. Ex ante, research co-operatives
cannot perfectly foresee the ex post productivity of the intermediate good they plan to
develop. Hence there is some uncertainty concerning future revenues. Formally the un-
certainty is modeled by the log-normal random variable εi. For shorter notation, σ2 will
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be used to denote the variance of εi, i.e. var(εi). Hence:
lnεi ∼ N
(
ln
[
{Eε}2
]
− 1
2
ln
[
{Eε}2 +σ2
]
, ln
[
1+
σ2
{Eε}2
])
. (8)
Besides being non-negative, the log-normal distribution is chosen because its mathemat-
ical properties makes it easy to work with. The intuitive assumption that development
requires some high-skill labor, l > 0 introduces the fixed cost necessary to assure that
co-operatives do not produce an infinitely small output.
Once the new intermediate good is developed it takes one unit of high-skill labor to
produce one unit of the new intermediate good. Formally the technology for research
firms are:
Xn,i = Sn,i− l. (9)
It is assumed that research firms are managed as co-operatives where total revenue
is distributed uniformly among its members. Since research firms hire only high-skill
workers, and all high-skill workers are identical, each member has the same objective.
The objective of the co-operative is described by the maximization of the expected util-
ity of the representative member. The co-operative’s revenue is the quantity produced
times the price. The price is given by the inverse demand function in (3b)
The maximization problem for the representative co-operative member is:
max
Sn,i,Pn,i,Xn,i
Eu
[
Pn,i×Xn,i
Sn,i
]
s.t. (3b) , (9). (10)
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The first constraint, (3b), ensures that the research co-operative’s price-quantity combi-
nation lies somewhere on the demand schedule of final good producers. The second con-
straint, (9), ensures that the research firm uses the only feasible production technology.
Solving problem (10) defines the optimal co-operative size for research co-operatives,
Sn,i, the optimal quantity to produce, Xn,i , the monopoly price, Pn,i and the wage for the
co-operative member, wn,i:
Sn,i =
l
α
(11a)
Xn,i =
1−α
α
× l (11b)
Pn,i = (1−α)1−α
[
αSc
l
]α
εi (11c)
wn,i(εi) = α
α(1−α)2−α
[
Sc
l
]α
εi. (11d)
The derivations are shown in Appendix B.1. Note that the co-operative’s size, Sn,i,
and quantity produced, Xn,i is independent of i. This is intuitive, all research firms
are identical ex-ante. Hence, the size of the co-operative, which is determined before
the productivity of the new intermediate is realized, is equal across all research co-
operatives. Further, since the co-operative members share the revenues all members are
engaged in the production process, unconditioned on the ex-post productivity, εi. Hence,
the quantity produced is equal across all research co-operatives. However, depending
on the productivity, each co-operative sell their intermediate good at a different price
and hence earn idiosyncratic revenues.
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2.3 Occupational Choice
Based on the assumption that research is a human capital intensive activity, the model
precludes low-skill workers to take any part in the economy’s research process. High-
skill workers, on the other hand, have the opportunity to work in the consumption sector
earning a certain wage or to work in the research sector as a member of a research co-
operative. A rational worker chooses the occupation that yields the highest expected
utility. Since all high-skill workers have identical endowments and identical preferences
all high-skill workers make the same occupational choice unless they are indifferent
between the two choices.
It is possible to have an equilibrium where all high-skill workers are employed in
the consumption good sector. With no research sector this model becomes a standard
two sector model and nothing new is added. Hence, it is assumed that if all high-skill
workers are employed in the consumption good sector the expected utility of forming
a research co-operative will exceed the expected utility of working in the consumption
good sector, formally:
u(wc) <
Sc = φ
Eu [wn,i(εi)]
Sc = φ
. (12)
With this additional assumption it is possible to show that a feasible equilibrium requires
that the expected utility of working in either the research sector or in the consumption
good sector is equal. It is very important to note that this implies that every result
derived later, must by checked against this condition, or equivalently, that the share of
high-skill workers doing research, µ, is greater than zero.
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If the share of high-skill workers doing research work, which is determined endoge-
nously, is solved for and turns out negative, i.e. µ < 0, then the utility of working in the
consumption good sector exceeds the expected utility working in the research sector.
If the expected utility of working in the consumption good sector exceeds the ex-
pected utility of working in the research sector more high-skill workers choose to work
in the consumption good sector. This increases Sc, and given (3c) and (11d) decreases
the wage rate in the consumption good sector but increases the expected wage in the
research sector. Hence Sc must become larger as long as the expected utility of working
in the consumption good sector exceeds the expected utility of working in the research
sector. In equilibrium the expected utility of working in the consumption good sector
can not exceed the expected utility of working in the research sector unless all high-skill
workers are employed in the consumption good sector. That scenario is discarded due
to the assumption stated in (12).
If the expected utility of working in the research sector exceeds the expected utility
of working in the consumption good sector all high-skill worker will choose to work in
the research sector. To see why that is impossible in equilibrium see equations (3c) and
(11d). If all high-skill workers are employed in the research sector Sc equals zero. From
(3c) it is clear that the wage rate in the consumption good sector equals +∞ and from
(11d) it is clear that the expected income from research work equals zero. Hence the
expected utility of research work can not exceed the expected utility of working in the
consumption good sector in equilibrium.
Hence, a feasible equilibrium requires that the utility of working in the consumption
sector equals the expected utility of working in the research sector, u(wc) = Eu(wn,i).
Elaborating on this condition, see Appendix B.2, implies the following equilibrium con-
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dition, from now on called the high-skill arbitrage condition:
wc = α
α(1−α)2−α
[
Sc
l
]α [
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
. (13)
2.4 Equilibrium
Table 1 reviews the important equilibrium variables. The endogenous variables of inter-
est are the income of low-skill workers, high-skill workers in the consumption sector,
high-skill workers in the research sector and the fraction of the high-skill workers that
choose to become researchers, denoted wo, wc, wn,i(εi) and µ respectively. In Appendix
B.3 it is shown how to derive expressions for those endogenous variables by combining
full employment assumptions and the high-skill arbitrage condition.
µ =
(1−α)
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ − [ α1−α]1−α [kol]α (1−φ)1−αφ
[
γ
1
α
i
]α
(1−α)
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
+αEεi
(14a)
wo = (1−α)
[φ(1−µ)
1−φ
]α[
γ
1
α
i
]α
kαo (14b)
wc = α
α(1−α)2−α
[φ(1−µ)
l
]α [
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ (14c)
wn,i(εi) = α
α(1−α)2−α
[φ(1−µ)
l
]α
εi. (14d)
2.4.1 Properties of µ
Equation (14a) gives an expression for the fraction of the high-skill workers in the re-
search sector. Hence this expression is constrained to be greater than zero but less than
one. Since the denominator is greater then the numerator µ can never exceed one. It is,
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Table 1: Equilibrium Variables
Producing Wage Skill Level Employees/Members Fraction
Xo,i wo Low-Skill Lo,i (1−φ)
Y wc High-Skill Sc φ(1−µ)
Xn,i wn,i(εi) High-Skill Sn,i φµ
however, quite possible that µ falls below zero. This is likely to happen if the variety of
old intermediate goods possible to produce in the period is large, i.e. ko large. A large
variety of old intermediate goods depresses the profitability of research co-operatives
producing new intermediate goods.
At a corner, solution, i.e. µ constrained to zero, both hypotheses investigated in this
paper can be rejected. It is immediately clear that an increase in the fraction of high-
skill workers in the economy, φ greater, increases the fraction high-skill workers that
choose to work in the research sector. Figure 2 plots µ, the fraction high-skill workers
that choose to work in the research sector.
Figure 2 verifies that as φ increases, the fraction of high-skill workers that choose
to work in the research sector increases. More old intermediate goods tend to decrease
the fraction of high-skill workers choosing to work in the research sector, by depressing
the profitability of new intermediate goods. Also, Figure 2 is important because for the
given parameter values it shows that µ is positive, thereby verifying the assumption in
(12).
2.4.2 Properties of wo
Equation (14b), describing the wage rate of low-skill workers, have some interesting
properties. Increasing the fraction of high-skill workers, φ, has several effects. The term,(φ(1−µ)
1−φ
)α
, captures the supply and demand effects. Note that since more high-skill
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Figure 2: Share of High-Skill Workers in Research Sector
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The figure shows the fraction of high-skill workers employed by research co-operatives, for
different combinations of the relative supply of high-skill workers, φ, and the number of old
intermediate goods, ko. For every combination of φ and ko, µ > 0.
workers choose to work in the research sector the effect is hampered, as φ increases, 1−
µ decreases. The term ko measures the higher productivity gains from more intermediate
goods, obtained by low-skill workers.
In a static setting, low-skill workers do not benefit from a larger variety of inter-
mediate goods due to more research, i.e. kn higher. However, in the long run, old
intermediate goods must be the result of new intermediate goods developed in earlier
periods. Hence, in the long run both high-skill and low-skill workers benefit from a
larger variety of intermediate goods.
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2.4.3 Properties of wc and wn,i
Together equations (14c) and (14d) show that on average Ewn,i is proportional to wc,
that is:
wc
Ewn,i(εi)
=
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
Eεi
. (15)
Hence the wage levels for high-skill workers in the consumption sector and high-
skill workers in the research sector move together and the log differential is determined
solely by the relative risk aversion, θ, and the mean and variance of the log-normal
distribution, Eε and σ2. As in the case of wo, wc and wn,i are affected by supply and
demand effects, via the term (φ(1−µ))α. However, wages in the consumption sector
are only indirectly dependent on the supply of low-skill workers, via µ.
3 Results
The following section makes use of the previously defined and solved model to draw
conclusions about wage differences in the growth economy. Recall that the paper’s two
hypotheses are:
1. Increasing the supply of high-skill workers increases the wage dispersion among
high-skill workers
2. Increasing the supply of high-skill workers increases the wage dispersion between
high-skill workers and low-skill workers
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3.1 High-Skill Workers Wage Distribution
Defining the income dispersion among high-skill workers, i.e. residual wage inequality
for high-skill workers, as the ratio of expected wage rate for workers in the research
sector to the certain wage rate of workers in the consumption sector implies a mea-
sure of inequality which, for this model, is independent of the relative supply of high-
skill workers. This claim is easily verified by the equilibrium relation between wc and
Ewn,i, given by (14c) and (14d). The expected income levels of researchers and high-
skill workers are linked and their relative magnitude depends only on the properties of
Eεi/
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
.
Inspecting the expression Ewn,iwc =
Eεi
[Eε1−θi ]
1
1−θ
more closely, see Appendix B.2, con-
firms some standard economic results concerning the risk premium:
∂
∂θ
Ewn,i
wc
=

ln
√
{Eε}2 +σ2
Eε

 Eε[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
> 0 (16a)
∂
∂σ
Ewn,i
wc
= θσ
[
{Eε}2 +σ2
] θ
2−1
Eεθ
> 0 (16b)
∂
∂Eε
Ewn,i
wc
= −θσ2 {Eε}−(1+θ)
(
{Eε}2 +σ2
) θ−2
2
< 0. (16c)
Income inequality among high-skill workers increases with stronger relative risk
aversion, (16a), and more uncertain returns to research, (16b). All else equal, increasing
the expected productivity of a new intermediate good invented by a co-operative makes
research more profitable, which tends to increase inequality. However, at the same
time, in equilibrium, the higher profitability in research firms implies that more high-
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Table 2: Distribution of W S
Realization, wS, of W S Probability/Share
wS < wc µP
(
wn,i(εi) < wS
)
wS ≥ wc (1−µ)+µ
[
1−P(wn,i(εi) < wS)]
skill workers choose to work in the research sector. An increasing number of workers
in the research sector decreases the number of high-skill workers in the consumption
good sector, increasing wages in the consumption good sector. Hence in equilibrium an
increase in the expected productivity of new intermediate goods have two counteracting
effects. As (16c) shows, the net effect is decreased inequality.
The independence between the income dispersion among high-skill workers and
the relative supply of high-skill workers is fragile. Measuring inequality among high-
skill workers by the variance wages for all high-skill workers shows that inequality can
increase or decrease with an increased relative supply of high-skill workers. Let W S
denote the wage rate of a high-skill worker unconditional on being employed in the
consumption good sector or in the research sector. Formally the distribution of W S is
summarized in Table 2. The variance of W S can be decomposed as:
var
(
W S
)
= (1−µ)σ2c +µσ2n +µ(1−µ)(Ewn,i(εi)−Ewc)2 . (17)
Equation (17) decomposes the variance of all high-skill workers into three parts, vari-
ance among workers in the consumption good sector, σ2c , variance among workers in
the research sector, σ2n, and lastly the part of total variance due to the wage differential
between consumption good workers and research workers, (Ewn,i(εi)−Ewc)2. High-
skill workers producing the consumption good are paid non-stochastic wages, therefore
Ewc = wc and σ2c = 0. Increasing the proportion of high-skill workers has several im-
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plications for the overall variance. First, from the second term of (17) more high-skill
workers earn a stochastic income, dµ/dφ > 0, increasing the overall variance. Second,
the weight of the third term, µ(1−µ) changes. The weight of the this term is maximized
for µ = 1/2 so it can increase or decrease depending on the number of high-skill workers
that already choose to do research work.
Apart from changing the weights in (17), increasing the supply of high-skill workers
also changes the variance among research workers, σ2n, and the wage difference between
research and consumption workers, Ewn,i(εi) − wc. Since the expression for wn,i(εi)
is multiplicative separable and the sign of dwn,i(εi)/dφ is ambiguous, σ2n can either
increase or decrease due to increases in φ. The same is true for the wage difference
between high-skill workers working with research and high-skill workers employed by
final good producers. Hence, increasing the share of high-skill workers, φ, can either
increase or decrease the variance of all high-skill workers’ wages.
To avoid this ambiguity and simplify the decomposition of total variance for high-
skill workers it is useful to investigate the distribution of lnW S. This also brings the
analysis closer to the empirical literature concerning wage inequality which concen-
trates on the distribution of the natural logarithm of wages. Let σˆ2n denote the variance
of the natural logarithm of wages in the research sector, i.e. var{ln [wn,i(εi)]}. The
expression decomposing total variance becomes:
var
(
lnW S
)
= µσˆ2n +µ(1−µ) [E ln(wn,i(εi))− ln(wc)]2 . (18)
The multiplicative separability of the wage expressions turns into additive separa-
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bility for the natural logarithm of the wage expressions. This in turn implies that:
dσˆ2n
dφ = 0 ,
d [E ln(wn,i(εi))−E ln(wc)]
dφ = 0.
Hence the effect of changes in the supply of high-skill workers, φ, on the variance of the
distribution of the natural logarithm of wages for all high-skill workers operates only via
changes in the fraction, µ, of high-skill workers choosing to work in the research sector.
Proposition 3.1.1 summarizes how the variance of high-skill wages changes with the
relative supply of high-skill workers. The proof can be found in Appendix B.4.
Proposition 3.1.1 (Residual Wage Inequality) The variance of the natural logarithm
of wages for high-skill workers, derived from the theoretical distribution of lnW S is
var
(
lnW S
)
= µ ln
(
1+
σ2
{Eε}2
)
+µ(1−µ)(1−θ)2

ln Eε√
{Eε}2 +σ2


2
(19a)
and its derivative with respect to φ is:
dvar
(
lnW S
)
dφ =

ln
(
1+ σ
2
{Eε}2
)
+(1−2µ)(1−θ)2

ln Eε√
{Eε}2 +σ2


2


× dµdφ . (19b)
Hence for sufficient low shares of researchers among high-skill workers, µ < 1/2, an in-
creased supply of high-skill workers increases wage dispersion among high-skill work-
ers. For larger shares of researchers among high-skill workers, µ > 1/2, the wage dis-
persion might increase or decrease with an increased supply of high-skill workers.
On the one hand, increasing the number of high-skill workers doing research always
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increases residual wage inequality, due to the fact that more high-skill workers earn a
stochastic wage rate. On the other hand, the discrepancy between the expected research
wage and the certain wage rate paid to workers employed by final good producers, i.e.
the risk premium, also increases residual wage inequality. However, the latter contri-
bution is maximized as number of workers in the research sector and the number of
workers employed by final good producers are equalized. Therefore this latter effect
can increase or decrease the residual wage inequality as the number of research workers
increases.
By inspecting the expression for µ, given by (14a), it is immediately clear that µ is
more likely to be less then 1/2 if the number of old intermediate goods, ko, is large,
the time necessary to develop a new intermediate good, l, is large, or the fraction of
high-skill workers, φ, is small.
Note that a low fraction of high-skill workers, φ, is associated with a low fraction
of high-skill workers choosing to work in the research sector, µ. Hence, economies
starting with a low fraction of high-skill workers, but increasing the fraction, are likely
to experience increased wage inequality for high-skill workers.
Figure 3 plots the residual wage inequality, as defined in Proposition 3.1.1 for the
same parameters values as in Figure 2. As is clear from the latter figure, µ is less then
1/2 and consequently, the residual wage inequality for high-skill workers increases with
the relative supply of high-skil workers.
3.2 The Skill Premium
Let τ denote the ratio of high-skill workers’ expected wage rate and low-skill workers’
wage rate, that is τ = EW Swo . After some algebraic manipulations, see Appendix B.5, the
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Figure 3: Residual Wage Inequality for High-Skill Workers
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The figure graphs the variance of wages, for high-skill workers, given different combinations of
the relative supply of high-skill labor, φ, and the number of old intermediate goods, ko.
expression for τ turns out to be:
τ =
α
1−α ×
1−φ
φ ×
(1−µ)
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
+µEεi
(1−µ)
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ − α1−αµEεi
. (20)
The following lemma is useful for comparing the impact of augmenting a standard
equilibrium model with a stochastic research sector, the proof is given in Appendix B.6.
Lemma 3.2.1 The expression
α
1−α ×
1−φ
φ .
describes the wage dispersion between high-skill workers and low-skill workers if there
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Figure 4: Skill Premium
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The figure illustrates the skill premium for different combinations of relative supply of
high-skill workers, φ, and the number of old intermediate goods, ko.
is no research sector.
To investigate the second hypothesis, that an increased supply of high-skill workers
increases wage dispersion between high-skill workers and low-skill workers, it is nec-
essary to investigate how τ changes with φ. That is, it is necessary to find the derivative
of τ with respect to φ. Proposition 3.2.2 summarizes the results on wage dispersion
between high-skill and low-skill workers. The proof is found in Appendix B.7.
Proposition 3.2.2 (The Skill Premium) Define the skill premium as the ratio of high-
skill workers’ expected wage rate to low-skill workers’ wage rate, then in equilibrium:
1. The skill premium increases with the number of high-skill workers choosing to
work in the research sector.
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2. Increased supply of high-skill workers, relative to the supply of low-skill workers,
increases the skill premium if and only if:
[
α
lko
]α
×
[
1−α
1−φ
]1−α
×
Eεi
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
[
γ
1
α
i
]α(
Eεi−
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
) ×φ2 < 1 (21a)
and
(1−α)
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ −
[
α
1−α
]1−α
[kol]α
(1−φ)1−α
φ
[
γ
1
α
i
]α
≥ 0. (21b)
Corollary 3.2.3 If there is no uncertainty, σ = 0, or high-skill workers are not risk
averse, θ = 0, increased relative supply of high-skill workers decreases the skill pre-
mium.
The first condition in the second part of proposition ensures that the skill premium
increases as the relative supply of high-skill workers increase. The second condition in
the second part of the proposition assures that in equilibrium, the number of research
workers is non negative, see (14a). Both those conditions must be satisfied, but it is not
easy to prove that such an equilibrium exist.
To prove the existence of such an equilibrium, Figure 4 plots the skill premium for
the same parameter values as in Figure 2. From Figure 2 it is clear that for all those
parameter values there is a non negative number of research workers and the second
condition in Proposition 3.2.2 is fullfilled. Further as is seen in Figure 4, for some range
of values the skill premium increases as the fraction of high-skill workers increases.
In general, large values of l,
[
γ
1
α
i
]α
, and large a number of old intermediate goods,
ko, clearly ensures that expression (21a) is less then unity, and hence the wage dispersion
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increases as the number of high-skill workers increases.
Corollary 3.2.3 highlights the importance of risk and risk aversion for the results
to hold. If agents are not risk averse or there is no risk, an increased relative supply
of high-skill workers decreases the wage inequality between high-skill and low-skill
workers, even though high-skill workers have the opportunity to make an occupational
choice.
4 Conclusions
This paper presents a stylized general equilibrium model, augmented by a profit driven
research sector. The labor force is divided into two categories, low-skill workers and
high-skill workers. Capital is excluded and the time frame is collapsed into a single
period during the entire analysis. The research sector is characterized by uncertain pay-
offs. Due to the model’s limited insurance possibilities for research workers, they have
to bear all risk associated with inventing new intermediate goods, their opportunity cost
being a foregone certain wage, paid by producers of consumption goods.
In a standard general equilibrium model, without a risky research sector, increased
supply of a specific production factor, ceteris paribus, tends to lower the returns to that
factor. If the research sector is excluded, research is non-stochastic or workers are risk
neutral, the model presented in this paper also predicts that increasing the supply of
high-skill workers lowers the average wage rate for high-skill workers.
However, since high-skill workers can choose to work in the research sector, as their
wages tend to fall due to an increased supply of high-skill workers, there is a reallocation
such that the fraction of high-skill workers choosing to work in the research sector
increases. This shift implies that more high-skill workers are paid a risk premium for
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bearing risk. The reduction in the wage rate for high-skill workers, due to the increased
supply of high-skill workers, is partly counteracted by a flow of high-skill workers from
the consumption goods sector to the research sector. Due to the flow of workers to the
research sector, more high-skill workers earn a risk premium. Therefore the average
wage rate for high-skill workers can increase due to an increased supply of high-skill
workers.
The formal analysis shows that the intuition outlined above is correct. There is no
simple relationship between an increased supply of high-skill workers and reduction in
wages for the same group. The comparative advantage of high-skill workers in produc-
ing knowledge, a good that is human capital intensive, combined with the uncertainty
associated with research activity blurs the standard increased supply, decreased wage
argument.
Appendices
A Record of Notation
In Table 3 the symbols used in the paper are listed and briefly explained.
B Proofs and Derivations
The following section contains the derivations and proofs of various results in the paper.
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Table 3: List of Symbols
Symbol Meaning
α Cobb-Douglas exponent.
ε Productivity of some new intermediate good.
γ Productivity of some old intermediate good.
µ Fraction of high-skill workers in developing co-operatives.
k Number of intermediate goods.
l Hours necessary to develop a new intermediate good.
L Quantity of low-skill labor.
P Price of some good.
φ Share of high-skill workers.
pi Profit rate.
σ2 Variation in productivity for a new intermediated good.
S Quantity of high-skill labor.
θ Relative risk aversion.
τ Skill premium.
w Wage rate.
X Quantity of an intermediate good.
Y Quantity of the consumption good.
B.1 The Co-operative Problem
A co-operative aiming at producing a new intermediate good Xn,i, must spend a fixed
amount of labor units, l, in order to invent the new good. Once the new intermediate
good is invented it takes one unit of high-skill labor to produce one unit of the inter-
mediate good. Let Sn,i denote of size of the ith co-operative, i.e. the total number
of high-skill labor units supplied by all its members. The co-operatives technology is
described formally by (9).
The co-operative’s revenue is given by the price times the quantity produced. Since
the co-operative’s intermediate good is unique, co-operatives face a monopoly situation.
Hence, co-operatives exploit the price-quantity relation given by the consumption good
producer’s demand function, given by (3b).
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The earnings are shared uniformly across the co-operative’s members. Hence the
earning of each member equals total revenues divided by the number of members. Since
the co-operative members are identical they all share the same objective; maximizing the
expected utility of total reveue per member. By using (9) and (3b) to substitute out Xn,i
and Pn,i. Given that the utility function is monotonically increasing and multiplicative
separable, the following simplifying steps are feasible:
max
Pn,i,Xn,i,Sn,i
Eu
[
Pn,i×Xn,i
Sn,i
]
s.t. (3b) and (9)
max
Sn,i
Eu
[
(1−α)Sαc
(Sn,i− l)1−α
Sn,i
εi
]
max
Sn,i
(Sn,i− l)1−α
Sn,i
. (22)
The last optimization problem is simple to solve. Substituting back gives the results for
the size of the co-operative, the quantity produced, the price, and the wage, as listed in
(11a), (11b), (11c), and (11d) respectively.
B.2 The High-Skill Arbitrage Condition
The derivation and simplification of the arbitrage condition, ensuring equalization of
high-skill workers’ expected utility from co-operative research work and working for a
certain wage in the consumption good sector, follows (note that wn,i is given by (11d)):
Eu[wc] = Eεiu [wn,i(εi)]
wc
1−θ = Eεi
[
wn,i(εi)
1−θ
]
wc = α
α(1−α)2−α
[φ(1−µ)
l
]α [
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
. (23)
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If εi is lognormally distributed with mean Eε and variance σ2. Then lnεi is normally
distributed with mean m and variance s2, where
m = ln
[
{Eε}2
]
− 1
2
ln[{Eε}2 +σ2]
s2 = ln
[
1+
σ2
{Eε}2
]
(24)
and
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
can written as:
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
= em+
(1−θ)s2
2
. (25)
Substituting out m and s2 by use of (24) the final expression for
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ become:
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
=
{Eε}1+θ√
{Eε}2 +σ2
θ . (26)
To verify that Eε >
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
note that if σ2 = 0 then
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
= Eε. Since[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ is monotonically decreasing in σ2 and σ2 > 0 the statement is verified.
B.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium there is full employment and hence the market for low-skill workers
must clear. Since the economy’s total labor endowment is normalized to unity, (1−φ)
is the share and the total number of low-skill workers. The number of high-skill workers
employed in the consumption good sector, Sc, equals φ(1−µ). That is, φ is the share of
high-skill workers, µ is the share of high-skill workers that are members of research co-
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operatives and the economy’s total labor endowment is normalized to unity. Low-skill
labor market equilibrium imply:
(1−φ) =
ko∑
i=1
Lo,i.
Substituting the low-skill labor demand, (7), and simplifying gives:
(1−φ) =
ko∑
i=1
Sc
[
(1−α)γi
wo
] 1
α
wo = (1−α)
[φ(1−µ)
1−φ ko
]α ko∑
i=1
γ
1
α
i
ko


α
wo = (1−α)
[φ(1−µ)
1−φ ko
]α [
γ
1
α
i
]α
. (27)
Using the inverse demand function for high-skill workers in the consumption good
sector, (3c), is equivalent to clearing the market for high-skill workers in the consump-
tion good sector. By substituting the quantity of each intermediate good used, (7) and
(11b), this condition becomes:
wc = α
[
1−α
wo
] 1−α
α
ko
[
γ
1
α
i
]
+αα
[
(1−α)l
φ(1−µ)
]1−α
knEεi. (28)
The number of new intermediate goods, kn is endogenous. Each research co-operative
employs l/α high-skill labor units, see (11a), and there are φµ high-skill labor units in
the research sector. Hence there are
α
φµ
l = kn. (29)
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research co-operatives and new intermediate goods.
Using the arbitrage condition for high-skill workers, (13), the expression for low-
skill workers’ wages, (27), and the expression for the number of new intermediate
goods, (29), to substitute out wc, wo and kn, respectively, after simplification µ is the
only unknown:
αα(1−α)2−α [1l ]α [Eε1−θi ]
1
1−θ φ−α(1−φ)1−α
[
γ
1
α
i
]α
kαo
=
αα(1−α)2−α [1l ]α [Eε1−θi ] 11−θ φµ+α1+α(1−α)1+α(1−α)1−αlαφµEεi
µ =
(1−α)[Eε1−θi ]
1
1−θ−[ α1−α ]
1−α
[kol]α (1−φ)
1−α
φ
[
γ
1
α
i
]α
(1−α)[Eε1−θi ]
1
1−θ +αEεi
. (30)
By substituting this expression into (27) and (28) the wage for low-skill workers and
high-skill workers in the consumption sector can be obtained as a function of exogenous
variable and parameters, only. However, the results are quite complex therefore it is
better to keep µ and remember that µ is endogenous.
Finally to find the earnings for a co-operative member of the co-operative indexed
by i, replace Sc by φ(1−µ) in (11d). Again substituting out µ by use of (14a) makes the
expression unnecessary complicated.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3.1.1
Let lnW S denote the random variable describing the natural logarithm of the wage rate
for any high-skill worker. The variance of lnW S can be decomposed into three parts:
the variance among high-skill consumption workers, the variance among high-skill re-
search workers and the difference between the average research and consumption wage.
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The consumption worker wage is non-stochastic so the first part vanishes from the de-
composition, hence:
var
(
lnW S
)
= µσˆ2n +µ(1−µ) [E lnwn,i(εi)− lnwc]2 . (31)
σˆ2n denotes the variance of the natural logarithm of the wage of research workers, which
by (14d) equals var(lnεi). By (14d) and (14c):
E lnwn,i(εi)− lnwc = E lnεi− ln
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
.
By using (8), describing the parameterization of the log-normal distribution of εi and
(26) the variance decomposition can be shown, by simple substitution and straight for-
ward simplification, to equal the expression in (19a). The differentiation is straightfor-
ward.
B.5 Wage Dispersion
First note that the average (i.e. expected) level of income for high-skill workers, EW S,
can be written in terms of wc:
EW S =
wc
[
(1−µ)
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
+µEεi
]
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
. (32)
Defining wage dispersion as the ratio between the average high-skill worker’s wage,
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EW S, and the wage of low-skill workers, wo, implies:
EW S
wo
=
αα(1−α)1−α(1−φ)α
lαkαo
[
γ
1
α
i
]α × (1−µ)
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
+µEεi[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
. (33)
Using the equilibrium value of µ given by (14a) to find an expression for kαo lα
[
γ
1
α
i
]α
as:
kαo lα
[
γ
1
α
i
]α
=
[
1−α
α
]1−α φ
(1−φ)1−α
[
(1−α)(1−µ)
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ −αµEεi
]
. (34)
Substituting this expression into (33) and performing some straightforward algebraic
manipulations, results in the expression for τ given by (20).
B.6 Proof of Lemma 3.2.1
By the inverse demand function for high-skill labor, (3c), the total wages payment for
all high-skill workers in the consumption sector, wcSc, are: αY . The total earnings of
all low-skill workers, Lo must equal the remaining part:
woLo = Y −wcSc = (1−α)Y .
Now, given that Sc = φ and Lo = 1−φ:
wc
wo
=
α
1−α ×
1−φ
φ . (35)
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B.7 Proof of Proposition 3.2.2
The expression for the income dispersion, τ, given by (20), depends on µ and µ depends
on φ. Hence to find the derivative dτdφ it is necessary to replace µ by the expression (14a)
or use the chain rule. Replacing µ by (14a) gives:
τ =
α[
γ
1
α
i
]α × Eεi−
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
αEεi +(1−α)
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
× (36)
×

 Eεi
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
Eεi−
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
[
1−α
α
]1−α [(1−φ)
kol
]α
− 1−φφ
[
γ
1
α
i
]α .
Simple derivation and simplification of (36) gives
dτ
dφ =
α
φ2 ×
Eεi−
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
αEεi +(1−α)
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
× (37)
×

1−
[
α
lko
]α[1−α
1−φ
]1−α Eεi[Eε1−θi ] 11−θ φ2(
Eεi−
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
)[
γ
1
α
i
]α

 .
which is positive only if (21a) is fulfilled. Condition (21b) is easily obtained by simpli-
fying µ≥ 0 using (14a).
To prove Corollary 3.2.3 note that if σ = 0 or θ = 0:
Eεi−
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
= 0.
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De-factorizing Eεi−
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ in (37) and imposing Eεi−
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
= 0 gives:
dτ
dφ = −
α[
γ
1
α
i
]α × Eεi
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
αEεi +(1−α)
[
Eε1−θi
] 1
1−θ
×
[
α
lko
]α[1−α
1−φ
]1−α
= − α[
γ
1
α
i
]α ×Eεi×
[
α
lko
]α[1−α
1−φ
]1−α
< 0.
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